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THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGION
RALPH BARTON PERRY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
It is generally agreed that religion is either the paramount
issue or the most serious obstacle to progress. To its devotees
religion is of overwhelming importance; to unbelievers it is, in
the phrasing of Burke, "superstitious folly, enthusiastical non-
sense, and holy tyranny." The difference between the friends
and the enemies of religion may, I think, be resolved as follows.
Religion recognizes some final arbitration of human destiny; it
is a lively awareness of the fact that, while man proposes, it is
only within certain narrow limits that he can dispose his own
plans. His nicest adjustments and most ardent longings are
overruled; he knows that until he can discount or conciliate
that which commands his fortunes his condition is precarious
and miserable. And through his eagerness to save himself he
leaps to conclusions that are uncritical and premature. Ir-
religion, on the other hand, flourishes among those who are more
snugly intrenched within the cities of man. It is a product of
civilization. Comfortably housed as he is, and enjoying an ar-
tificial illumination behind drawn blinds, the irreligious man has
the heart to criticize the hasty speculations and abject fear of those
who stand without in the presence of the surrounding darkness.
In other words, religion is perpetually on the exposed side of
civilization, sensitive to the blasts that blow from the surrounding
universe; while irreligion is in the lee of civilization, with enough
remove from danger to foster a refined concern for logic and
personal liberty. There is a sense, then, in which both religion
and irreligion are to be justified. If religion is guilty of unreason,
irreligion is guilty of apathy. For without doubt the situation of
the individual man is broadly such as religion conceives it to be.
There is nothing that he can build, nor any precaution that he
can take, that weighs appreciably in the balance against the
powers which decree good and ill fortune, catastrophe and tri-
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umph, life and death. Hence to be without fear is the part of
folly. Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.
Religion is man's recognition of the overruling control of his
fortunes. It is neither metaphysical nor mythical, but urgently
practical. Primeval chaos, Chronos the father of Zeus, and
the long line of speculative Absolutes have no worshippers be-
cause they take no hand in man's affairs. They may be neg-
lected with impunity. But not so the gods who send health and
sickness, fertility and death, victory and defeat, or he who
sits in judgment on the last day to determine the doom of eternity.
Religion is the manifestation of supreme concern for life, an
alertness to the remotest threat of danger and promise of hope.
A certain momentousness attaches to all the affairs of religion,
because everything is at stake. Its dealings are with the last
court of appeal, in behalf of the most indispensable good.
In form, religion is a case of belief; that is, of settled conviction.
There is no religion until some interpretation of life, some ac-
commodation between man and God, has been so far accepted
as to be unhesitatingly practised. The absurdity of doubt in
matters of religion has been pointed in the well-known parody,
" O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul." The
quality of religion lies not in the entertaining of a speculative
hypothesis, but in an assurance so confident that its object is
not only thought, but enacted. God is not God until his un-
questioned existence is assimilated to life. Indeed, it is con-
ceivable that an object thus made the basis of action should still
remain theoretically doubtful. To Fontenelle is attributed the
remark that he " did not believe in ghosts, but was afraid of them."
This is a paradox until we distinguish theoretical and practical
conviction; then it becomes not only credible, but commonplace.
If one prays to God, it is not necessary for the purposes of religion
that one should in Fontenelle's sense believe in him. But I prefer
to use the term " belief " more strictly, to connote such assent as
expresses itself, not in a deliberate judgment made conformable to
one's intellectual conscience, but in fear, love, and purpose, in
habitual imagery, in any attitude or activity that is spontaneous
and that freely presupposes the object with which it deals.
By conceiving religion as belief we may understand not only
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its air of certainty but also the variety of its forms and agencies.
Belief sits at the centre of life and qualifies all its manifestations.
Hence the futility of attempting to associate religion exclusively
with any single function of man. The guises in which religious
belief may appear are as multiform as human nature, and will
vary with every shading of mood and temperament. Its central
objects may be thought, imagined, or dealt with—in short, re-
sponded to in all the divers ways, internal and overt, that the
powers and occasions of life define.
This will suffice, I trust, to lay the general topic of religion
before us. I shall employ the terms and phrases which I have
formulated as a working definition: Religion is belief on the part
of individuals or communities concerning the final or overruling
control of their interests. I propose from this point to keep in
the forefront of the discussion the standards whereby religion is
to be estimated, and approved or condemned. On what grounds
may a religion be criticized ? What would constitute the proof
of an absolute religion? History is strewn with discredited
religions; men began to quarrel over religion so soon as they had
any; and it is customary for every religious devotee to believe
jealously and exclusively. There can be no doubt, then, that
religion is subject to justification; it remains to distinguish the
tests which may with propriety be applied, and in particular to
isolate and emphasize the moral test.
In the first place let me mention briefly a test which it is cus-
tomary to apply, but which is not so much an estimate as it is
a measure. I refer to the various respects in which an individual
or community may be said to be more or less religious. Thus, for
example, certain religious phenomena surpass others in acuteness
or intensity. This is peculiarly true of the phenomena mani-
fested in conversion and in revivals. In this respect the mysteries
of the ancients exceeded their regular public worship. Individ-
uals and communities vary in the degree to which they are cap-
able of enthusiasm, excitement, or ecstasy.
Or a religion may be measured extensively. He whose re-
ligion is constant and uniform is more religious than he whose
observance is confined to the Sabbath day, or he whose concern
in the matter appears only in time of trouble or at the approach
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of death. This test may best be summed up in terms of consist-
ency. Religion may vary in the degree to which it pervades the
various activities of life. That religion is confined and small
which manifests itself only in words or public deeds or emo-
tions exclusively. If it is to be effective it must be systematic, so
thoroughly adopted as to be cumulative and progressive. It
must engage every activity, qualify all thought and imagination,
in short, infuse the whole of life with its saving grace.
It is clear, however, that a measure of religion does not con-
stitute either proof or disproof. If a religion be good or true, or
on like grounds accredited, then the more of it the better. But
differences of degree appear in all religions. Indeed, the quanti-
tative test has been most adequately met by forms of religion
the warrant of which is generally held to be highly questionable.
We may, therefore, dismiss this test without further consideration.
The application of it must be based upon a prior and more fun-
damental justification.
There is one test of religion which has been universally applied
by believers and critics alike, a test which, I think, will shortly
appear to deserve precedence over all others. I refer to the
test of truth. Every religion has been justified to its believers
and recommended to unbelievers on grounds of evidence. It
has been verified in its working, or attested by either observa-
tion, reflection, revelation, or authority.
In spite of the general assent which this proposition will doubt-
less command, it is deserving of special emphasis at the present
time. Students of religion have latterly shifted attention from
its claims to truth to its utility and subjective form. This prag-
matic and psychological study of religion has created no little
confusion of mind concerning its real meaning, and obscured
that which is after all its essential claim—the claim, namely, to
offer an illumination of life. Religious belief, like all belief, is
reducible to judgments. These judgments are not, it is true,
explicit and theoretically formulated; but they are none the less
answerable to evidence from that context of experience to which
they refer. It is true that the believer's assurance is not con-
sciously rational, but it is none the less liable before the court
of reason. Cardinal Newman fairly expressed the difference be-
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tween the method of religion and the method of science when he
said that "ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt," that
"difficulty and doubt are incommensurate." Nevertheless, the
difficulties are in each case germane; and the fact that every
article of faith has its besetting doubt is proof that the thorough
justification of faith requires the settlement of theoretical diffi-
culties.
No religion can survive the demonstration of its untruth, for
salvation, whether present or eternal, depends on processes act-
ually operative in the environment. Religion must reveal the
undeniable situation, and prepare man for it. It must charge
the unbeliever with being guilty of folly, with deceiving himself
through failing to see and take heed. Every religious propaganda
is a cry of warning, putting men on their guard against invisible
dangers; or a promise of succor, bringing glad tidings of great
joy. And its prophecy is empty and trivial if the danger or the
succor can be shown to be unreal. The one unfailing bias in
life is the bias for disillusionment, springing from the organic
instinct for that real environment to which, whether friendly or
hostile, it must adapt itself. Every man knows in his heart that
he cannot be saved through being deceived. Illusions cannot
endure; and those who lightly perpetrate them are fortunate if
they escape the resentment and swift vengeance which over-
took the prophets of Baal.
The grounds of religious truth will require prolonged con-
sideration ; but before discussing them further let me first mention
a test of religion which belongs to the class of psychological and
pragmatic tests to which I have just alluded, but which has
latterly assumed special prominence. Though realizing that I
use a somewhat disparaging term, I suggest that we call this
the therapeutic test. It has been proved that the state of piety
possesses a direct curative value through its capacity to exhilarate
or pacify, according to the needs of a disordered mind. As a po-
tent form of suggestion, it lends itself to the uses of psychiatry; it
may be medicinally employed as a tonic, stimulant, or sedative.
Now we can afford to remind ourselves that from the point of
view of the patient this use of religion bears a striking resemblance
to certain primitive practices in which God was conceived as a
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glorified medicine-man, and the healing of the body strangely
confused with spiritual regeneration. Bishop Gregory of Tours
once addressed the following apostrophe to the worshipful St.
Martin: " O unspeakable theriac! ineffable pigment! ad-
mirable antidote! celestial purgative! superior to all the skill of
physicians, more fragrant than aromatic drugs, stronger than all
ointments combined! thou cleanest the bowels as well as scam-
mony, and the lungs as well as hyssop; thou cleanest the head
as well as camomile!"1
It is true that religion is in these days recommended for more
subtle disorders; but even religious ecstasy may be virtually
equivalent to a mere state of emotional exhilaration, or piety to
a condition of mental and moral stupor. What does it profit
a man to be content with his lot, or to experience the rapture
of the saints, if he has lost his soul ? The saving of a soul is a
much more serious matter than the cessation of worry or the
curing of insomnia, or even than the acquiring of a habit of de-
lirious joy. Tranquillity and happiness are, it is true, the legiti-
mate fruits of religion, but only provided they be infused
with goodness and truth. If religion is to be a spiritual tonic,
and not merely a physical tonic, it must be based on moral or-
ganization and intellectual enlightenment. I do not doubt that
religion has in all times recommended itself to men mainly
through its contributing to their lives a certain peculiar buoyancy
and peace. There is such a generic value in religion, which can-
not be attributed wholly to any of its component parts. But,
like the intensity or extent of religion, this may manifest itself
upon all levels of development. Sound piety, a tranquillity and
happiness which mark the soul's real salvation, must be founded
on truth, on an interpretation of life which expresses the fullest
light. Again, then, we are referred to the test of truth for the
fundamental justification of religion. There is a generic value
which is deserving of the last word, but that word can be said only
after a rigorous examination of the moral fundamental values
from which it is derived.
Religious truth is divisible into two judgments, involved in
every religious belief, and answerable respectively to ethical and
1
 Munro and Sellery, Mediaeval Civilization, p. 69.
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cosmological evidence. Since religion is a belief concerning the
overruling control of human interests, it involves on the one
hand a summing up of these interests, a conception of what the
believer has at stake, in short an ethical judgment; and on the
other hand, an interpretation of the environment at large, in
other words a cosmological judgment. Religion construes the
practical situation in its totality; which means that it generalizes
concerning the content of fortune, or the good, and the sources of
fortune, or nature. Both factors are invariably present, and no
religion can escape criticism on this twofold ground.
The ethical implications of religion are peculiarly far-reaching,
since they determine not only its conception of man, but also in
part its conception of God. This is due to the fact that the term
God signifies not the environment in its inherent nature, but
the environment in its bearing on the worshipper's interests. It
follows that whether God be construed as favorable or hostile
will depend upon the worshipper's conception of these interests.
Thus, if worldly success or long life be regarded as the values most
eagerly to be conserved, God must be feared as cruel or capri-
cious; whereas, if the lesson of discipline and humility be con-
ceived as the highest good, the providence of God may be trusted
without any change in its manifestation.
Furthermore, as we shall shortly have occasion to remark, it
is characteristic of religion to insist, so far as possible, upon the
favorableness of the environment. But this favorableness must
be construed in terms of what are held to be man's highest in-
terests. Consequently, the disposition and motive of God always
reflect human purposes. This is the main source of the inevitable
anthropomorphism of religion.
Conceptions of nature, on the other hand, define the degree
to which the environment is morally determined, and the unity
or plurality of its causes. Animism, for example, reflects the
general opinion that the causes of natural events are wilful rather
than mechanical. Such an opinion obtained at the time when
no sharp distinction was made between inorganic and organic
phenomena, the action of the environment being conceived as
a play of impulses.
Religion is corrected, then, by light obtained from these sources:
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man's knowledge of his highest interests and his knowledge of
nature. As a rule, one or the other of these two methods of
criticism tends to predominate in accordance with the genius of
the race or period. Thus the evolution of Greek religion is de-
termined mainly by the development of science. Xenophanes
attacks the religion of his times on the ground of its crude an-
thropomorphism. "Mortals," he says, "think that the gods
are born as they are, and have perception like theirs, and voice
and form." But this naive opinion Xenophanes corrects because
it is not consistent with the new enlightenment concerning the
&PXV> or first principle of nature. "And he [God] abideth
ever in the same place, moving not at all; nor doth it befit him to
go about, now hither, now thither."2
In a later age Lucretius criticized the whole system of Greek
religion in terms of the atomistic and mechanical cosmology of
Epicurus:
For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things station them-
selves each in its right place guided by keen intelligence, nor did they
bargain sooth to say what motions each should assume, but because many
in number and shifting about in many ways throughout the universe,
they are driven and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after
trying motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into arrange-
ments such as those out of which our sum of things has been formed.3
In the light of such principles Lucretius demonstrates the
absurdity of hoping or fearing anythmg from a world beyond or
a life to come. In this case, as in the case above, the religion of
enlightenment does not differ essentially from the religion of
the average man in its conception of the interests at stake, but
only in its conception of the methods of worship or forms of imagery
which it is reasonable to employ in view of the actual nature of the
environment.
If on the other hand we turn to the early development of the
Hebrew religion, we find that it is corrected to meet the demands
not of cosmological, but of ethical enlightenment. No question
arises as to the existence or power of God, but only as to what he
1
 Fragments of Xenophanes. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 115.
3
 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, i, 1021-28. Translation by Munro.
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requires of those who serve him. The prophets represent the moral
genius of the race, its acute discernment of the causes of social
integrity or decay. " And when ye spread forth your hands, I will
hide mine eyes from you: yea, when ye make many prayers,
I will not hear: your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make
you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes;
cease to do evil: learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the
oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."4
But whichever of these two methods of criticism predominates,
it is clear that they both draw upon bodies of truth which grow
independently of religion. The history of Christianity affords
a most remarkable record of the continual adjustment of re-
ligious belief to secular rationality. The offices of religion have
availed no more to justify cruelty, intolerance, and bigotry than
to establish the Ptolemaic astronomy or the scriptural account
of creation. This is more readily admitted in the case of natural
science than in the case of ethics, but only because teachers of
religion have commonly had a more expert acquaintance with
moral matters than with the orbits of the planets or the natural
history of the earth.
For the principles of conduct, like the principles of nature,
must be derived from a study of the field to which they are ap-
plied. They require nothing more for their establishment than
the analysis and generalization of the moral situation. If two
or more persons conduct themselves with reference to one another
and to an external object, their action either possesses or lacks,
in some degree, that specific value which we call moral goodness.
And by the principles of ethics we mean the principles which
truly define and explicate this value. Now neither the truth
nor the falsity of any religion affects these fundamental and es-
sential conditions. If the teachings of religion be accepted as
true, then certain factors may be added to the concrete practical
situation; but if so, these fall within the field of morality and
must be submitted to ethical principles. Thus, if there be a
God whose personality permits of reciprocal social relations with
man, then man ought, in the moral sense, to be prudent with
reference to him, and may reasonably demand justice or good-will
at his hands.
' Isaiah 1 15-17.
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But the mere existence of a God, whatever be his nature, can
neither invalidate nor establish the ethical principles of pru-
dence, justice, and good-will. Were a God whose existence is
proved to recommend injustice, this would not affect in the slight-
est degree the moral obligation to be just. Moral revelation
stands upon precisely the same footing as revelation in the sphere
of theoretical truth: its acceptance can be justified only through
its being confirmed by experience or reason. In other words, it
is the office of revelation to reveal truth, but not to establish it.
In consequence of this fact it may even be necessary that man
should redeem the truth in defiance of what he takes to be the
disposition of God. Neither individual conscience nor the moral
judgment of mankind can be superseded or modified save through
a higher insight which these may themselves be brought to con-
firm. Whatever a man may think of God, if he continues to live
in the midst of his fellows, he places himself within the jurisdic-
tion of the laws which obtain there. / Morality is the method of
reconciling and fulfilling the interests of beings having the capacity
to conduct themselves rationally, and ethics is the formulation
,of the general principles which underlie this method.) The at-
tempt to live rationally—and, humanly speaking, there is no alter-
native save the total abnegation of life—brings one within the
jurisdiction of these principles, precisely as thinking brings one
within the jurisdiction of the principles of logic, or as the moving
of one's body brings one within the jurisdiction of the principles
of mechanics.
Religion, then, mediates an enlightenment which it does not
of itself originate. In religious belief the truth which is derived
from a studious observation of nature and the cumulative ex-
perience of life is heightened and vivified. Like all belief, re-
ligion is conservative; and rightly so. But in the long run, steadily
and inevitably, it responds to every forward step which man is
enabled to take through the exercise of his natural cognitive
powers. Only so does religion serve its real purpose of benefiting
life by expanding its horizon and defining its course.
I have hitherto left out of account a certain stress or insistence
that must now be recognized as fundamental in religious develop-
ment. This I shall call the optimistic bias. This bias is not
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accidental or arbitrary, but significant of the fact that religion,
like morality, springs from the same motive as life itself, and
makes towards the same goal of fruition and abundance. Life is
essentially interest, and interest is essentially positive or provident;
fear is incidental to hope, and hate to love. Man seeks to know
the worst only in order that he may avoid or counterwork it in the
furtherance of his interests. Religion is the result of man's search
for support in the last extremity. This is true even when men
are largely preoccupied with the mere struggle for existence. It
appears more and more plainly as life becomes aggressive and
is engaged in the constructive enterprise of civilization. Religion
expresses man's highest hope of attainment, whether this be con-
ceived as the efficacy of a fetish or the kingdom of God.
Such, then, are the general facts of religion and the fundamen-
tal critical principles which justify and define its development.
Religion is man's belief in salvation, his confident appeal to the
overruling control of his ultimate fortunes. The reconstruction
of religious belief is made necessary whenever it fails to express the
last verified truth, cosmological or ethical. The direction of
religious development is thus a resultant of two forces: the opti-
mistic bias, or the saving hope of life, and rational criticism, or
the progressive revelation of the principles which define life and
its environment.
I shall proceed now to the consideration of types of religion
which illustrate this critical reconstruction. The types which
I shall select represent certain forms of inadequacy which I think
it important to distinguish. They are only roughly historical,
as is necessarily the case, since all religions represent different
types in the various stages of their development and in the different
interpretations which are put on them in any given time by vari-
ous classes of believers. I shall consider in turn, using the terms
in a manner to be precisely indicated as we proceed, superstition,
tutelary religion, and two forms of philosophical religion, the
one metaphysical idealism, and the other moral idealism.
Superstition is distinguished by a lack of organization both
in man and his environment. It is a direct cross-relationship
between an elementary interest, passion, or need, and some iso-
lated and capricious natural power. The deity is externally
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related to the worshipper, having private interests of his own which
the worshipper respects only from motives of prudence. Religious
observance takes the form of barter or propitiation—do ut des,
do ut abeas. The method of superstition is arbitrary, further-
more, in that it is defined only by the liking or aversion of an
unprincipled agency.
Let us consider briefly the type of superstition which is associ-
ated with the most primitive stage in the development of society.
The worshipper has neither raised nor answered the ethical
question as to what is his greatest good. Indeed, he is much
more concerned to meet the pressing needs of life than he is to
co-ordinate them or understand to what they lead. He cannot
even be said to be actuated by the principle of rational self-
interest. Like the brute whose lot is similar to his own, he feels
his wants severally, and is forced to meet them as they arise
or be trampled under foot in the struggle for existence. There
is little co-ordination of his interests beyond that which is pro-
vided for in the organic and social structure with which nature
has endowed him. Over and above the instinct of self-preser-
vation he recognizes in custom the principle of tribal or racial
solidarity. But this is proof, not so much of a recognition of
community of interest, as of the vagueness of his ideas concerning
the boundaries of his own selfhood. The very fact that his in-
terests are scattering and loosely knit prevents him from clearly
distinguishing his own. He readily identifies himself not only
with his body, but with his clothing, his habitation, and various
trinkets which have been accidentally associated with his life.
It is only natural that he should similarly identify himself with
those other beings like himself with whom he is connected by
the bonds of blood and of intimate contact. Morally, then,
primitive man is an indefinite and incoherent aggregate of in-
terests which have not yet assumed the form even of individual
and community purpose.
To turn to the second, or cosmological, component, we find
that primitive man's conception of ultimate powers is like his
conception of his own interests in being both indefinite and inco-
herent. In consequence of the daily vicissitudes of his fortune, he
is well aware that he is affected for better or for worse by agencies
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which fall outside the more familiar routine operations of society
and nature. So great is the disproportion between the calcu-
lable and the incalculable elements of his life that he is like a
man crouching in the dark expecting a blow from any quarter.
The agencies whose working can be discounted in advance form
his secular world; but this world is narrow and meagre, and is
overshadowed by a beyond which is both mysterious and terrible.
Of the world beyond he has no single comprehensive idea, but
he acknowledges it in his expectation of the injuries and benefits
which he may at any time receive from it. It is an abyss whose
depths he has never sounded, but which he is forced practically
to recognize, since he is at the mercy of forces which emanate
from it.
The method of primitive religion is the inevitable sequel. In
behalf of the interests which represent him, man must here, as
ever, make the best terms he can with the powers which beset
him. He has no concern with these powers except the desire
to propitiate them. He has no knowledge of their working ex-
cepting as respects their bearing upon his interests. Obeying a
law of human nature which is as valid now as then, he seeks for
remedies whose proof is the cure which they effect. Let the
association between a certain action on his own part and a fav-
orable turn in the tide of fortune once be established, and the
subsequent course of events will seem to confirm it. Coincidences
are remembered, and exceptions forgotten. Furthermore, there
always remains, as the final justification for his belief in the
effectual working of the established plan, the difficulty of proving
any other alternative plan to be better.
But, in order to understand superstition, it is not necessary to
reconstruct the earliest period in the history of society, nor even
to study contemporary savage life; for the superstitious intelli-
gence and the superstitious method survive in every stage of
development. They appear, for example, in mediaeval Christian-
ity; in Clovis's appeal to Christ on the battlefield, "Clotilda says
that Thou art the Son of the living God, and that Thou dost give
victory to those who put their trust in Thee. I have besought
my gods, but they give me no aid. I see well that their strength
is naught. I beseech Thee, and I will believe in Thee, only save
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me from the hands of mine enemies." The same period is repre-
sented by the petition attributed to Saint Eloi, "Give, Lord, since
we have given! Da, Domine, quia dedimus/"* In modern life
the motive of superstition pervades almost all worship, appearing in
prayer for rain or the healing of the sick, and in sundry expecta-
tions of special favor to be gained by service or importunity.
The application of critical enlightenment to this type of religion
has already been made with general consent. It is recognized
that morally superstition represents the merely prudential level
of life. It bespeaks a state of panic or a narrow regard for iso-
lated needs and desires. Furthermore, it tends to emphasize these
considerations and at the same time degrade the object of wor-
ship through claiming the attention of God in their behalf.
The deity is conceived not under the form of a broad and con-
secutive purpose, but under the form of a casual and desultory
good nature.
But superstition has been corrected mainly by the advance-
ment of scientific knowledge. Science has pronounced finally
against the belief in localized or isolated natural processes.
Whether the mechanical theory be accepted or not, its method
is beyond question in so far as it defines laws and brings all events
and phenomena under their control. So far as nature is con-
cerned, there can be no favoritism, no special dispensations, no
bargaining over the counter.
The correction of superstition brings us to our second type,
which I have chosen to call tutelary religion. It is distinguished
by the fact that life is organized into a definite purpose, which,
although still narrow and partisan with reference to humanity at
large, nevertheless embraces and subordinates the manifold
desires of a community. The deity represents this purpose in
the cosmos at large, and rallies the forces of nature to its sup-
port. He is no longer capricious, but is possessed of a character
defined by systematic devotion to an end. His ways are the
ways of effectiveness. Furthermore, since his aims are identical
with those of his worshippers, he is now loved and served for
himself. It follows that he will demand of his followers only
conformity to those rules which define the realization of the com-
6Munro and Sellery, Mediaeval Civilization, pp. 80, 75.
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mon aim, and that these rules will be enforced by the commun-
ity as the conditions of its secular well-being. Ritual is no
longer arbitrary, but is based on an enlightened knowledge of
ways and means.
While this type of religion is clearly present in the most prim-
itive tribal worship, it is best exemplified when a racial or national
purpose manifests itself aggressively and self-consciously, as in
the cases of ancient Assyria and Egypt. Here God is identified
with the kingship, both being symbols of nationality. Among
the Assyrians the national purpose was predominantly one of
military aggrandizement. Istar communicates to Esarhaddon
this promise of support: "Fear not, O Esarhaddon; the breath of
inspiration which speaks to thee is spoken by me, and I conceal
it not. . . . I am the mighty mistress, Istar of Arbela, who have
put thine enemies to flight before thy feet. Where are the words
which I speak unto thee, that thou hast not believed them ? . . .
I am Istar of Arbela; in front of thee and at thy side do I
march. Fear not, thou art in the midst of those that can heal
thee; I am in the midst of thy host."9
Egyptian nationality was identified rather with the principles
of agriculture and political organization. The deity is the fer-
tilizing Nile, or the judge of right conduct. There is recorded in
the Book of the Dead the pleading of a soul before Osiris, in which
the commands of the god are thus identified with the conditions
of national welfare.
I have not committed fraud and evil against men.
I have not diverted justice in the judgment hall.
I have not known meanness.
I have not caused a man to do more than his day's work.
I have not caused a slave to be ill treated by his overseer.
I have not committed murder.
I have not spoiled the bread of offering in the temples.
I have not added to the weight of the balance.
I have not taken milk from the mouths of children.
I have not turned aside the water at the time of inundation.
I have not cut off an arm of the river in its course.7
'Sayce, Babylonians and Assyrians, p. 253.
i Wiedemann, Religion of the Ancient Egyptians, p. 250.
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Similar illustrations might be drawn from the nationalistic
phase of Hebraism. The same principle appears in mediaeval
Christianity, and is thus embodied in the prologue of the Salic
Law, "Long live the Christ who loves the Franks." In more
recent times one might point to the Christianity of the Puritan
revolution, not wholly misrepresented by the maxim popularly
attributed to Cromwell, "Put your trust in God and keep your
powder dry," or in Poor Richard's observation that "God helps
them that help themselves."
Such is the religion of nationalism, sectarianism, of sustained
but narrow purpose. I shall not attempt to formulate exhaustively
the ideas through which this religion has been corrected. It
is clear that its defect lies in its partisanship. All forms of
partisanship yield slowly but inevitably to the higher conception
of social solidarity. Such enlightenment reflects a recognition
of community of interest, and a widening of sympathy through
intercourse and acquaintance. Tutelary religion, in short, is cor-
rected through the validity of the ethical principles of justice and
good will. The cosmological correction of this type of religion is
due to the same enlightenment that discredits superstition, a
knowledge, namely, of a systematic unity of the cosmos. The
laws of nature are as indifferent to private purposes as they are
to private desires, and whether they be personal or social in their
scope. Furthermore the universality of God is recognized in
principle in the rules of worship. For a god of war or agricult-
ure or politics cannot be privately appropriated. If the observ-
ance of the principles proper to these institutions brings success
to one, it brings success to all. In short, a god of nationality
must be a god of all nations.
The correction of tulelary religion brings us at length to
a type which may be said to be formally enlightened. Both
components of belief, the ethical and the cosmological, are uni-
versalized. I shall call this type, in its general form, philosoph-
ical religion, since it recognizes the unities which systematic
reflection defines. It recognizes, on the one hand, the summing
up of life in a universal ideal, and on the other hand, a summing
up of the total environment in some scientifically formulated
generalization. It affirms the priority of justice and good-will
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over party interest, and the determination of the world without
reference to special privilege. Religion is now the issue between
the good—the highest good, the good of all—and the undivided
cosmos.
Within the limits of philosophical religion thus broadly defined,
there is yet provision for almost endless variety of belief. Relig-
ions may still differ in tradition, symbolism, and ritual. They
may differ as moral codes and sentiments differ, and reflect all
shades of opinion as this is determined by discovery and criticism.
But I propose to confine myself to a difference which is at once
the most broad and fundamental, and the most clearly defined,
in contemporary controversy. This difference relates to neither
ethics nor cosmology exclusively, but to the religious judgment
itself in which these two are united. How is the universe in its
entirety to be construed with reference to the good ? In both
of the answers which I propose to consider it is claimed that
goodness in some sense possesses the world. Hence both may
be called idealisms. But in one of these answers, which I shall
call metaphysical idealism, the cosmological motive receives the
greater emphasis. The good is construed in terms of being; and,
in order that it may be absolutely identified therewith, its original
nature must, if necessary, be compromised. In the other, the
ethical motive predominates. It is held that goodness must
not lose its meaning, even if it be necessary that its claims upon
the cosmos should be somewhat abated.
Metaphysical idealism is the extreme form of the optimistic
bias. It provides a moral individual with a sense of proprietor-
ship in the universe; it justifies him in the belief that the moral
victory has been won from all eternity. Goodness is held to be
the very essence and condition of being.
Let me briefly state the inherent difficulty in this philosophy
of religion. Being is judged to be identical with good. But the
world of experience is not good; it must therefore be condemned as
unreal. Wherein, then, lies the goodness of being ? If an empty
formalism is to be avoided, the all-good and all-real must be
restored to the world of experience. But, as the all-real it cannot
consistently be identified with only a part of that world; and if it
be identified with the whole, its all-goodness contradicts the moral
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distinction between good and evil. The theory is now confronted
with the opposite danger, that of materialism, or moral promis-
cuousness. Let me illustrate this full swing of the pendulum
from formalism to materialism by briefly summarizing certain
well-known types of religious philosophy.
At the formalistic extreme stands the Buddhistic pessimism,
which rests on a recognition of the inevitable taint of this world,
of the implication of evil in life. To avoid this taint, the all-real
and all-good must be freed even from existence. It can be con-
ceived and attained only by denial. Nirvana is at once the all-
real, the all-good, and—in terms of the existent world—nothing.
Other-worldliness is the Christian modification of the Oriental
philosophy of illusion. Heaven is a world beyond, to be ex-
changed for this. It is not constituted by the denial of this world,
as is Nirvana, but access to it is conditioned by such denial. It
is goodness and happiness hypostasized, and offered as compen-
sation for martyrdom. But since every natural impulse and
source of satisfaction must be repudiated, it remains a purely
formal conception, except in so far as the worldly imagination
unlawfully figures it. Rigorously construed, it consists only in
obedience, a willing of God's will, whatever that may be.
Mysticism, which appears as a motive in all religions of this
type, defines the all-real and all-good in terms of the consumma-
tion of a progression certain intermediate stages of which consti-
tute man's present activities. In Brahmanism, God is the perfect
unity, which may be approximated by dwelling on identities and
ignoring differences; in Platonism, God is the good-for-all, which
may be approximated by dwelling exclusively upon the utilities
and fitnesses of things. The absolute world still remains beyond
this world and excludes it, although a hint of its actual nature
may now be obtained. But there at once appears a formidable
difficulty. So long as the absolute world is wholly separated from
this world, and therefore purely formal, evil need not be imputed
to it; but at the moment when it is conceived by completing and
perfecting certain processes belonging to this world, it is committed
to these processes with all their implications, and tends to be
usurped by them. In other words, heaven, in so far as it obtains
meaning, grows worldly.
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In the conception which may be termed panlogism, heaven
is boldly removed to earth. It is identified with laws or other
universals that lie within the scope of human intelligence and
control the course of nature. God is now immanent rather than
transcendent; he has obtained a certain definable content. But
the difficulty which has already appeared in mysticism now grows
more formidable. How can it be said that a being that co-
incides with the known laws of nature works only good ? Among
the Stoics the attempt was made to conceive all necessities as
somehow "beneficial," as somehow good in the commonly accepted
sense of the term.8 But even the Stoics found themselves
compelled to abandon the common conception of goodness.
And in Spinoza the motive of panlogism is clear and un-
compromising. God as the immanent order of the world is
good only in that he is necessary—good only in so far as
he satisfies the logical interest and enables the mind to un-
derstand. In panlogism, then, we find metaphysical idealism
already compelled in behalf of its cardinal principle to deny
the moral consciousness. But this is not all. For, even
were it to be admitted that mere system and order constitute the
good wholly without reference to their bearing on the concerns
of life, the fact remains that even such a good does not fairly
represent the character of this world. For experience conveys
not only law, but also irrelevance and chaos; not only harmony
but also discord.
To meet this last difficulty, and at the same time better to pro-
vide for the complexity of human interests, metaphysical idealism
finally assumes the aesthetic form. The absolute world, the all-
real and all-good, is boldly construed in terms of the historical
process itself, with all its concreteness and immediacy. Endless
detail, contrast, and even contradiction may be brought under
the form of aesthetic value. The very flux of experience, the
very struggles and defeats of life, are not without their pictur-
esqueness and dramatic quality. Upon this romantic love of
tumult and privation is founded the last of all metaphysical
idealisms. A strange sequel to the doctrine of despair with which
our brief survey began!
8 Cf., e.g., Epictetus, Discourses, chap. 8.
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I can only recapitulate most briefly the characteristic limita-
tions of an aesthetic idealism. Firstly, in spite of the fact that
aesthetic value may be extraordinarily comprehensive in its
content, as a value it is none the less narrow and exclusive.
For in order that experience may have aesthetic value, an aes-
thetic interest must be taken in it. And even were all experience
to satisfy some such interest, this would in no wise provide for
the endless variety of non-aesthetic interests that are also taken
in it. Thus, were it to be proved that life on the whole is pictur-
esque, this would in no way affect the fact that it is also painful,
stultifying, and otherwise abounding in evil.
But, even if it were to be granted that aesthetic value embraces
and subordinates all other values, this higher value would still
exist only where such an aesthetic interest was actually fulfilled.
If it were assumed that the totality of the world is pleasing in the
sight of God, this would in no way affect the fact that it is other-
wise in the eyes of men. Those who furnish a spectacle which
has dramatic value for an observer do not themselves share in
that value. It is an incontrovertible fact that even the aesthetic
interests of men are actually defeated; and this whether or no
some other aesthetic interest, that for example of a divine on-
looker, is fulfilled.
But the radical defect of this aesthetic philosophy of religion lies
in its absolute discrediting of moral distinctions. Optimism has
so far overreached itself as to sacrifice the very meaning of good-
ness. In order that the ideal may possess the world, it has been
reduced to the world. God is no more than a name for the un-
mitigated reality. Like Hardy's Spirit of the Years, he is the mere
affirmation of things as they are:
I view, not urge; nor more than mark
What designate your titles Good and 111.
'Tis not in me to feel with, or against,
These flesh-hinged mannikins Its hand upwinds
To click-clack off Its preadjusted laws;
But only through my centuries to behold
Their aspects, and their movements, and their mould.9
» Hardy, The Dynasts, Part i, p. 5.
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Morally, there could be no more sinister interpretation of life.
It offers itself as a philosophy of hope, promising the lover of good
that his purpose shall be fulfilled, nay, that it is fulfilled from all
eternity. But when the pledge is redeemed, it is found to stipu-
late that the good shall mean only life as it is already possessed.
In other words, man is promised what he wants if he will agree
to want what he has. This is worse than a sorry jest. It is
a philosophy of moral dissolution, discrediting every downright
judgment of good and evil, removing the grounds upon which is
based every single-minded endeavor to purify and consummate
life. John Davidson says: "Irony integrates good and evil, the
constituents of the universe. It is that Beyond-Good-and-
Evil that somebody clamored for."10 Irony is indeed the last
refuge of that uncompromising optimism that equates goodness
and being.
But the bankruptcy of metaphysical idealism does not end the
matter. There is another idealism in which religious faith both
confirms moral endeavor and gives it the incentive of hope. This
idealism establishes itself upon an unequivocal acceptance of
moral truth. It calls good good and evil evil, with all the finality
which attaches to the human experience of these things, leaving
no room for compromise. Its faith lies in the expectation that
the world shall become good through the elimination of evil;
it manifests itself in the resolution to hasten that time. God is
loved for the enemies he has made. Evil is hated without reser-
vation as none of his doing, and man is free to reverence the Lord
his God with all his heart.
From the standpoint of moral idealism the universe resumes
something of its pristine ruggedness and grandeur. If, as James
says, " the world appears as something more epic than dramatic,"
the dignity of life is enhanced and not diminished on that ac-
count.11 Life is not a spiritual exercise the results of which are
discounted in advance; but is actually creative, fashioning and
perfecting a good that has never been. And the moment evil is
conceived as the necessary but diminishing complement to par-
tial success, the sting of it is gone. Evil as a temporary and
accidental necessity is tolerable; but not so an evil which is
i" Davidson, A Rosary, p. 88. u James, Pragmatism, p. 144.
182 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
absolutely necessary, and which must be construed with some
hypothetical divine satisfaction.
This in no way contradicts the fact that the fullest life under
present conditions involves contact with evil. Innocence must
be tragic if it is not to be weak. Jesus without the cross would
possess something of that quality of unreality which attaches to
Aristotle's high-minded man. But this does not prove that life
involves evil; it proves only that life will be narrow and com-
placent when it is out of touch with things as they are. Since
evil is now real, he who altogether escapes it is ignorant and idle,
taking no hand in the real work to be done. Not to feel pain
when pain abounds, not to bear some share of the burden, is
indeed cause for shame. In that remarkable allegory, "The
Man who was Thursday," Chesterton has most vividly presented
this truth. In the last confrontation, the real anarchist, the
spokesman of Satan, accuses the friends of order of being happy,
of having been protected from suffering. But the philosopher,
who has hitherto been unable to understand the despair to which
he and his companions have been driven, repels this slander.
" I see everything," he cried, " everything that there is. Why does each
thing on the earth war against each other thing? Why does each small
thing in the world have to fight against the world itself? . . . So that
each thing that obeys law may have the glory and isolation of the anar-
chist. So that each man fighting for order may be as brave and good
a man as the dynamiter. So that the real lie of Satan may be flung back
in the face of this blasphemer, so that by tears and torture we may earn
the right to say to this man, 'You lie!' No agonies can be too great to
buy the right to say to this accuser, 'We also have suffered.'
" It is not true that we have never been broken. We have been broken
upon the wheel. . . . We have descended into hell. We were com-
plaining of unforgettable miseries even at the very moment when this
man entered insolently to accuse us of happiness. I repel the slander;
we have not been happy." n
But the charge of happiness is to be repelled as a slander only
because there are real sufferers in the world to make the charge.
It is after all not happiness but insensibility which is the real
12 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday, p. 278.
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disgrace. If the suffering is real, not to see it, not to feel it, not
to heal it, is intolerable. To say, however, that suffering is will-
fully caused in order that it may eventually contribute to an ul-
timate reconciliation, is to charge God with something worse than
complacency. If life is a real tragedy, it can be endured, and
to enter into it will bring the deep satisfaction which every form
of heroism affords. But if the tragedy of life be preconceived
and wilfully perpetrated, it must be resented for the sake of self-
respect. Even man possesses a dignity which is not consistent
with puppetry and mock heroics.
Moral idealism means to interpret life consistently with ethical,
scientific, and metaphysical truth. It endeavors to justify the
maximum of hope, without compromising or confusing any
enlightened judgment of truth. In this it is, I think, not only
consistent with the spirit of a liberal and rational age, but also
with the primary motive of religion. There can be no religion
with reservations, fearful of increasing light. No man can do
the work of religion without an open and candid mind as well
as an indomitable purpose.
I cannot here elaborate the evidence upon which moral ideal-'
ism is grounded; but it might be broadly classified as ethical,
cosmological, and historical. The ethical ground of moral ideal-
ism is the virtual unity of life, the working therein of one eventual
purpose sustained by the good will of all moral beings. The
cosmological proof lies in the moral fruitfulness and plasticity of
nature. The historical proof lies in the fact of moral progressiin the advent and steady betterment of life.
In conclusion I wish to revert to the topic of the generic proof
of religion. We have defined the tests which any special religion
must meet, and unless conformably to such tests it is possible
to justify some form of idealism, it is clear that the full possibili-
ties of religion as a source of strength and consolation must fail
to be realized. But it may now be affirmed that there is a moral
value in religion which is independent of the cosmological consid-
erations which prove or disprove a special religion. No scientific
or metaphysical evidence can controvert the fact that man is en-
gaged in an enterprise which comprehends all the actualities and
possibilities of life, and that the success of this enterprise is con-
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ditioned in the end on the compliance of the universe. A sum-
ming up of the situation as involving these two factors is morally
inevitable. Some solution of the problem, assimilated and
enacted, in other words, some form of piety, is no more than the
last stage of moral growth.
The value of religious belief, in this generic moral sense, con-
sists in the enlargement of the circle of life. Man knows the
best and the worst. He walks in the open, apprehending the
world in its full sweep and just proportions. An inclusive
view of the universe, whatever it may reveal, throws into relief
the lot of man. Religion promulgates the idea of life as a whole,
and composes and proportions its activities with reference to
their ultimate end. Religion advocates not the virtues in their
severalty, but the whole moral enterprise. With this it affili-
ates all the sundry activities of life, thus bringing both action and
thought under the form of service of the ideal. At the same
time it offers a supreme object for the passions, which are other-
wise divided against themselves, or vented upon unworthy and
fantastical objects. Through being thus economized and guided,
these moving energies may be brought to support moral endeavor
and bear it with them in their current.
Piety carries with it also that sense of high resolve without which
life must be haunted with a sense of ignominy. This is the imme-
diate value of the good will: the full deliverance of one's self to
the cause of goodness. This value is independent of attainment.
It is that doing of one's best which is the least that one can do.
Having sped one's action with good will, one can only leave the
outcome to the confluence and summing of like forces. But such
service is blessed both in the eventualities and in a present har-
mony as well. The good of participation in the greatest and most
worthy enterprise is proved in its lending fruitfulness, dignity,
and momentousness to action; but also in its infusing the indi-
vidual life with that ardor and tenderness which is called the love
of humanity and of God, and which is the only form of happiness
that fully measures up to the awakened moral consciousness.
Since religion emphasizes the unity of life and supplies it with
meaning and dignity, it is the function of religion to kindle moral
enthusiasm in society at large. Religion is responsible for the
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prestige of morality. As an institution, it is the appointed guar-
dian and medium of that supreme value which is hidden from
the world; of that finality which, in the course of human affairs,
is so easily lost to view and so infrequently proved. It is there-
fore the function of the religious leader to make men lovers, not
of the parts, but of the whole of goodness. Embarrassed by their
very plenitude of life, men require to have the good will that
is in them aroused and put in control. This, then, is the work
of religion: to strike home to the moral nature itself, and to in-
duce in men a keener and more vivid realization of their latent
preference for the higher over the lower values. This office
requires for its fulfilment a constructive moral imagination, a
power to arouse and direct the contagious emotions, and the
use of the means of personality and ritual for the creation of a
sweetening and uplifting environment.
In culture and religion human life is brought to the elevation
which is proper to it. They are both forms of discipline through
which is inculcated that spirit of magnanimity and service which
is the mark of spiritual maturity. But while culture is essentially
contemplative, far-seeing, sensitive, and tolerant, religion is more
stirring and vital. Both are love of perfection, but culture is
admiration; religion concern. "Not he that saith Lord, Lord,
but he that doeth the will of his Father, shall be saved." In
religion the old note of fear is always present. It is a perpetual
watchfulness lest the work of life be undone, or lest a chance
for the best be forfeited.
